The urban transport challenge in India Considerations, implications and strategies Motor-vehicle activity is growing rapidly, and causing a wide range of adverse impacts, in Indian cities.
attention in Indian cities. In Delhi, for example, air quality has been poor since the late s. Surveys in the mid-s showed daily average suspended particulate levels, which are strongly correlated with respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, exceeding WHO (World Health Organization) guideline limits almost daily, with peak levels as high as - times the WHO limit at many sites. Daily average sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide levels exceeded WHO limits on several days annually, at several sites. Ozone has been a major problem, especially in winter (CPCB, ; CSE, ; CPCB, ). Road accidents cause a significant number of fatalities and injuries. India's road safety record, already among the world's worst, is deteriorating steadily. Nationwide, road accidents are the primary cause of accidental deaths; the death toll due to this cause rose from around , fatalities in  to around , fatalities in  (MORTH, ).
The rapid growth in motor-vehicle activity in India is important not only because of the many adverse local impacts that it causes, but also from the perspective of regional and global impacts such as acidification and climate change, and energy security. Acidification and ground-level ozone effects are increasing rapidly in Asia. Local and regional impacts due to these effects (and particulates) include damage to soils, vegetation and crops, and forest and aquatic ecosystems, groundwater pollution due to toxic metal leaching, impaired visibility, metal corrosion, and structural damage to buildings and monuments (the famed Taj Mahal has been a prominent victim) (Faiz et al., ) . Of particular concern in a region that is home to around two billion people (or about one third of the total global population) is crop yield reduction due to air pollution. The 'Asian Brown Cloud', which is observed to persist over South and South-East Asia, reportedly reduces sunlight by  per cent and, consequently, evaporation from the seas and rainfall (UNEP, ). Further, while even low ozone levels can seriously diminish crop yields, ozone appears to affect tropical crops more severely than US and European ones. While damage is estimated to be  per cent in the USA (except for sensitive crops in California), it could be  per cent for wheat, soybean, rice and groundnut in the North Indian bread-basket states of Punjab and Haryana, with profound implications for food security (Roychowdhury, ).
At the global level, transport already consumes about a quarter of commercial energy. Energy consumption in transport has serious security implications, since this sector already consumes as much as  per cent of the world's oil, and oil demand is growing more rapidly in this than in any other sector (IEA, ). Also, motor vehicles contribute significantly to emissions of gases implicated in climate change, including carbon dioxide. With rapid growth in motor-vehicle activity, energy consumption and related carbon dioxide emissions from global transport have grown by about a third every decade over the last three decades (IEA, ). In India, transport accounted for nearly half of petroleum product consumption in /. Nationally, petroleum product consumption has been growing at an increasing rate since the s, and has very nearly doubled in just the last decade. The gap between local production and demand has been rising rapidly, and has had to be met through imports. Oil imports alone account for nearly a fifth of all Indian imports, and it is expected that three-quarters of India's oil requirement will have to be imported in . The future is worrisome, given projected trends in motor-vehicle and other energy-intensive activities, India's vulnerability to world oil prices, and the possibility that Indian oil reserves will last only two or three decades at current production levels (TERI, ; ).
Contextual factors affecting urban transport outcomes
The fact that motor-vehicle activity in India causes serious adverse impacts is due to several factors. In this regard, the first point to note is that, as in other low-income countries, motor-vehicle activity in India has been concentrated in the large metropolitan centres, because these centres account for economic activity and jobs, and political power disproportionate to their share of national populations. The situation in India has been considerably better in this regard than in countries such as Iran, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines and Thailand, whose capital cities have been reported to account for - per cent of national automobile fleets (Faiz et al., ) . Nonetheless, five cities (Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai, Chennai and Bangalore) account for only around  per cent of India's population but about  per cent of its motor vehicle fleet. Further, Delhi, the Indian capital, with only a little over  per cent of the population, alone accounts for around  per cent of the nation's motor vehicles and, in a reflection of the concentration of economic and political power in the city,  per cent of the nation's cars (SIAM, ; TERI, ; UN Population Division, ).
The next point to note is that motor-vehicle activity in India has been characterised by very high levels of impacts. While more recent models have entered the market since the early s, Indian motor vehicle technology has been decades behind global practice, and in some instances, s' and s' vintage vehicles continue to be manufactured (AIAM, ; SIAM, ). Motor-vehicle activity in India has therefore until recently been characterised by very high pollution intensities. As in other Asian countries, motorised two-wheeled (MW) vehicles, which provide affordable mobility to millions with few other attractive options, have formed the bulk of the vehicle fleet (Sathaye et al., ). Indeed, MW vehicles have been the most rapidly growing vehicle type in India, and represent around two-thirds of motor vehicles nationally (AIAM, ; SIAM, ). India has one of the largest populations of this vehicle type of any country. The vast majority of MW vehicles, and forhire motorised three-wheeled (MW) vehicles, have until recently been powered by highly polluting two-stroke engines. Tests in the early s showed that these vehicles, which typically carry one to four persons, produced higher levels of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon, and a quarter of the particulate emissions per kilometre, relative to buses, despite buses having much larger, more powerful engines, and carrying over  people, and themselves being heavy polluters (IIP, ; Shah and Nagpal, ). Fuel and oil quality has also contributed significantly to high pollution intensities. Until the mid-s, when significant improvements in fuel quality began to be implemented, lead in gasoline, which has been a serious public health concern globally, was as high as . grams per litre in  octane gasoline, and benzene, a known carcinogen for which the WHO specifies no safe limit in air, was not controlled at all. Levels of sulphur, an important constituent in particulate emissions, were as high as . per cent and  per cent by weight respectively in Indian gasoline and diesel until the mid-s, as against . per cent in Californian re-formulated gasoline, and . per cent in US diesel, at around the same time (BIS, a; b; Faiz et al., ) .
The effects of vehicle technology and fuel quality have been exacerbated by in-use operating conditions. Several studies worldwide have shown that maintenance is a significant factor in vehicular performance, and that particulate emissions, for example, can increase between tenfold and twentyfold in poorly maintained diesel and twostroke MW vehicles (Faiz et al., ; Shah and Nagpal, ). Maintenance levels in India are poor despite low labour and high fuel costs. Nor is poor maintenance unique to personal motorised modes. Even buses operated by state-owned transit operators are poorly maintained (Tiwari, ). Operators of commercial vehicles, which are predominantly privately owned, have little ability or incentive to invest in proper maintenance, given high operating costs and low profit margins. Poor maintenance by vehicle users has been compounded by several institutional factors. Good quality spare parts are expensive in India, in part because of high sales taxes, and inadequate spares have therefore been commonly used (Duleep, ; Iyer and Balaraman, ). Monitoring and enforcement in the Indian context have been, and continue to be, ineffective. Vehicle emission inspection regimes are technically flawed, open to corruption, and burdensome for users, who have circumvented or subverted the testing process (Badami, ). Fuel and lubricating oil adulteration has also been an important contributory factor to high pollution intensities. For example, MW vehicle operators, who typically do not own their vehicles, commonly adulterate their gasoline with as much as  per cent kerosene, and even solvents. To guard against the resulting wear and tear, they mix in as much as  per cent of lubricating oil, the principal source of particulates in two-stroke engines (Raje and Malhotra, ). This adulteration has been enabled principally by the fact that kerosene, which is the poor person's cooking fuel, is heavily subsidised, and was significantly cheaper -by as much as a factor of  to  -than gasoline during the late s (TERI, ).
Because of factors such as poor maintenance and fuel adulteration, many in-use vehicles can pollute heavily, despite vehicle emission standards having been progressively tightened in the s (Shah and Nagpal, ; TERI, ). This situation, which is due to vehicle and fuel technological factors, and vehicle user choices, is further exacerbated by the rapidly growing traffic congestion already noted. Besides causing time and productivity losses, highly congested driving conditions typical of Indian cities significantly exacerbate vehicular emissions and energy consumption (Faiz et al., ) . Congestion has increased in Indian cities because of the general inadequacy of the road infrastructure to cater for the rapid growth in motor-vehicle activity, but inadequate road infrastructure is not the only cause. After all, congestion is increasing, and is likely to continue to do so, in Delhi, which does not suffer from a lack of roads -the city has a road length per capita higher than those of wealthy Asian cities such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo, and only marginally smaller than in European cities (Kenworthy and Laube, ; TERI, ). Traffic congestion in Indian cities is also due to the wide range of vehicle types moving at different speeds, and the lack of adequate modal separation and effective transport system management. Because dedicated facilities for buses and slow-moving traffic such as bicycles and rickshaws are typically lacking, sub-optimal conditions are created for all modes. Bicycles tend to use the kerb lane on multiple-lane roads, and motor vehicles are prevented from using the lane even at low bicycle densities, disrupting the traffic flow in all lanes, and severely reducing it, especially during peak hours (Tiwari, ). It is also precisely because of the lack of modal separation, ineffective enforcement of traffic regulations and, as we will see shortly, the high trip shares of vulnerable non-motorised modes and motorised modes such as MW vehicles, that road accident and fatality rates are as high as they are.
Because of the concentration of motor-vehicle activity in metropolitan centres with large populations, and the high level of associated impacts, owing to technological and infrastructural constraints, and operational factors which in turn are influenced by socio-economic conditions and institutional regimes, high levels of exposure and health and welfare effects result due to, for example, transport emissions and accidents. Although the OECD countries have accounted for the bulk of motorvehicle activity and related energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions (whose effects are projected globally), their share of locally harmful transport emissions such as particulates and sulphur dioxide has been low, on account of superior pollution control technologies; in the low-income countries, the situation has been the reverse (Faiz et al., ) . Indeed, while the urban air pollution situation has been generally stabilised in OECD cities, that in the poor countries, already serious, has been deteriorating. India suffers far more traffic fatalities than the whole of North America, with a fraction of its motor-vehicle activity; note in this regard that Delhi, the most motorised Indian city (SIAM, ; TERI, ), has only around  motor vehicles (of all types) per , persons (NCTD, ; UN Population Division, ). Thus, motor-vehicle activity in India (and other low-income countries) is causing far higher impacts than in the OECD countries, despite far lower motorvehicle activity levels.
Not only does motor-vehicle activity impose very high impacts, but also it is the low-income groups and the poor, who form the bulk of urban populations in countries such as India, that are the most affected by these impacts, while contributing the least to them, and generally benefiting the least from motor-vehicle activity. In the case of air pollution, for example, the poor often suffer the highest exposures, since many of them live and work near the roadside, where air pollution levels are typically higher than farther away. Further, because they are in marginal health, and lack adequate nutrition and medical care, the poor are also the most affected by, and the least capable of coping with, the impacts of air pollution, because of synergies between pollution, poverty and nutritional deficiency (CSE, ; Faiz et al., ), and poor access to health care. In the case of road accidents, the majority of the fatalities are pedestrians and cyclists. While car and taxi occupants accounted for only  per cent of Delhi's road accident fatalities in , pedestrians, cyclists and MW vehicle users accounted for ,  and  per cent respectively (Tiwari, ). It is sadly ironic that the modes that contribute the least to road fatalities are the most affected by them -cycling has the highest ratio of share of fatalities to share of passenger trips in Delhi. Further, road accidents can be particularly devastating for the poor: apart from the health and emotional impacts, the economic costs of accidents can ruin poor families who, because of lack of savings, are often forced to sell their assets and go into debt, which can never be repaid (Tiwari, ).
Factors contributing to motor-vehicle ownership and use
Rising incomes are certainly an important factor contributing to rapid motorisation in cities in India and other low-income countries, as Faiz et al. () have pointed out. As incomes increase, the poor majority purchase bicycles, and those who own bicycles graduate to MW vehicles. Further, as motor-vehicle production has grown rapidly as a result of economic liberalisation, supply constraints have greatly eased. Many financing institutions have started up in business, and credit has become easy to obtain. Manufacturers are offering old vehicle buy-back schemes in order to generate sales. While the above factors certainly play an important role, increased motorvehicle ownership and use are also responses to the circumstances in which users find themselves. The rapid pace of urbanisation, due to natural growth and in-migration of the rural poor, has contributed to urban sprawl, which in a vicious circle has further increased motor-vehicle ownership and activity. The urban area of Delhi, for example, has grown fivefold since  (DDA, ; Misra et al., ). Correspondingly, average trip lengths have increased .-. times (RITES/ORG, ). The effects of sprawl are aggravated by the fact that many low-and middle-income persons have no choice but to live in the urban periphery, in areas poorly served by public transit, because they can no longer afford housing in the inner areas. Finally, transit is becoming increasingly unreliable, inconvenient and time-consuming (Misra et al., ; Tiwari, ).
Given these effects, it is not surprising that motor-vehicle activity has increased as rapidly as it has. Because of sprawl, unaffordable housing close to workplaces, increased congestion due to growing motor-vehicle activity, and poor transit service, people are forced to purchase and use personal motor vehicles, if they can afford them. The rapid growth in motor-vehicle ownership and activity is reflected in the significantly reduced non-motorised mode shares over the years: in Delhi, bicycle trips fell from  per cent to  per cent of trips by all mechanical modes between  and . In the western Indian city of Pune, households with bicycles fell from  per cent to  per cent, while those with MW vehicles rose from  per cent to  per cent, between  and  (RITES/ORG, ; Sathaye et al., ). Growth in motor-vehicle activity in Indian cities has outstripped population growth rates, which have themselves been quite dramatic. While Delhi's population has grown eighteenfold in the approximately  years since  (when India gained independence), its motorvehicle population has grown more than twentyfold in half the time. Motor-vehicle sales grew at an annual rate of  per cent in the s and s, as against a population increase of - per cent per annum in those two decades. Motor-vehicle numbers are no longer increasing at the same pace, but they are still growing at around  per cent per annum. The motor vehicle fleet presently stands at around four million (AIAM, ; DDA, ; Mohan et al., ; NCTD, ; SIAM, ; UN Population Division, ). Of course, to get a real sense of growing motor-vehicle activity and its impacts, it is necessary to consider both the growth in motor-vehicle numbers and that in trip distances, which has already been discussed.
The immense popularity of MW vehicles in Indian cities is not surprising either. MW vehicles are accessible to owners round the clock, offer reliable, door-to-door service, require little parking space, can be parked securely inside the home, and can carry passengers as well as things. Although these vehicles contribute to congestion, they can cope with it as no other motorised mode can, because of their size and manoeuvrability. Indeed, they are much faster than buses, and only slightly slower than a car (Fig.  ). Yet they can be bought for a fraction of the cost of a car. Buses are used only when it is unavoidable, and since cars are beyond the reach of all but a few, a MW vehicle is purchased as soon as possible. MW vehicles (and for-hire paratransit vehicles) offer excellent and affordable mobility, and easy access to employment and other essential services, and have thus become a necessary choice (and expenditure) in a context in which there are few other attractive options. Finally, MW vehicles are becoming increasingly easy to use; for example, many MW vehicles are now push-button, rather than kick-started. This simple improvement is dramatically expanding personal mobility for women. At the same time, of course, MW ownership and use could increase rapidly, as women abandon public transit. Public transit is particularly oppressive for women, since they have to deal with harassment at transit stops and on board transit vehicles (Badami, ). In Delhi, about . out of . million vehicles in  were MW vehicles; MW vehicles now number around . million (Mohan et al., ; NCTD, ). Given the per-vehicle emissions of these vehicles compared to buses, as discussed earlier, Delhi has effectively had, in pollution terms over the s, about - million buses, each carrying no more than two or three people!
The Indian context: multiplying demands, dwindling resources
A series of policy measures have been implemented since the early s to reduce per-vehicle air pollutant emissions and congestion. These have included technological and institutional measures such as improved vehicle emission and fuel and oil quality standards, inspection and maintenance regimes to control in-use vehicle emissions, vehicle scrappage, and alternative fuel systems such as compressed natural gas (for a comprehensive listing of these measures, see, for example, CSE, ), and transport infrastructure and transport system management measures to increase average speeds for motor vehicles, such as limited-access expressways and grade-separated intersections (Tiwari, ). While such measures represent significant improvements -for example, Indian MW vehicle emission standards are the strictest in the world, except for Taiwan and Thailand, sulphur in gasoline and diesel has been reduced significantly, and there are proposals to make vehicle emission and fuel quality standards even more stringent over the next few years (BIS, a; b; TERI, ) -they have involved considerable expenditure of financial and administrative resources, and social control.
Even without resource constraints, such technological measures can be neutralised by increasing motor-vehicle activity and congestion, as the US experience shows. Capital and maintenance expenditures on US highways have increased  and  per cent per annum respectively since the s (as against an annual growth in motor vehicles of - per cent), and in , US highway expenditures amounted to an astounding US$ million every day (Federal Highway Administration, ). Notwithstanding this, congestion has worsened, and is expected to continue to do so, particularly on highways in the smaller urban centres. Despite dramatic gains in vehicle pollution control, and significant corresponding improvements in urban air quality from about the same time, air quality in US cities could worsen in the next two decades, because of increased vehicle activity and congestion, and slower vehicle turnover (Calvert et al., ; Federal Highway Administration, ). The Indian context, on the other hand, is characterised by restricted technological, financial and administrative resources. Even in Delhi, the nation's capital, local government agencies lack the resources to monitor and enforce vehicle testing and repair, effectively deal with fuel and oil adulteration, or control unplanned development in fringe areas, all of which have significant implications for transport activity and impacts (Badami, ).
As for expanding transport infrastructure to accommodate growing motor-vehicle activity and address congestion, there is little scope to do so in the urban Indian context. Large-scale road building would be disruptive, would displace large numbers of poor people, and would further compromise access for non-motorised mode users, who are already the most affected in this regard. Building limited-access highways and flyovers, as is currently happening in Indian cities, could increase journey times for cyclists and pedestrians, unless specific provisions were included for these modes. Finally, such infrastructure 'improvements' would probably increase the need for motor-vehicle ownership and use, leading to growing motor-vehicle activity and congestion, and the need to build more highways, in a vicious spiral. This is a situation with which even US cities are barely able to cope; in Indian cities, this situation would quite simply be impossible to handle, given their resource constraints and high population densities and poverty levels.
As discussed, motor-vehicle activity in India is causing far higher levels of congestion, air pollution, road fatalities, compromised access and mobility and other transport impacts than in the OECD countries, despite far lower motor-vehicle activity levels and, as we will see, high non-motorised mode and public transit shares. While infrastructure and resources are far from adequate to accommodate even present impact levels, motor-vehicle activity is likely to grow over the coming decades in Indian cities, as urbanisation proceeds apace, urban incomes grow, motor-vehicle activity continues to be concentrated in the cities, and as sprawl, congestion and motor-vehicle activity feed on each other.
There are severe constraints even in terms of addressing urban transport impacts, but these impacts are by no means the only serious urban problems in Indian cities. Water pollution due to ineffective sewage and human waste disposal, and other effluents, is perhaps the most widespread urban environmental problem in India. Coupled with inadequate and overcrowded housing and poor solid-waste disposal, water pollution causes water-and vector-borne diseases that are responsible for millions of mortalities and morbidities annually, mainly among children (CSE, ). In a World Bank study by Brandon and Homman (), water pollution alone accounted for  per cent of total health impacts due to environmental pollution in Indian cities, more than those due to any other environmental offence. Thus, Indian cities are having to address modern health and environment risks such as those due to motor vehicles, even as they continue to confront traditional ones, many of which cause far greater, and more easily preventable, damage to human health and welfare than transport impacts, important as they are. The poor majority bear the brunt of these impacts, since they are typically the most exposed to, most affected by, and least capable of coping with them.
The already serious urban situation is rendered more daunting by the fact that, even as basic urban infrastructure and services are already woefully inadequate, and the resources necessary to provide them dwindle, demands multiply rapidly. The population of Delhi, for example, which was a mere ,, roughly the current population of several medium-sized Western cities, in , had increased to . million in , representing a  per cent increase over a mere half-century, and a doubling in less than twenty years, since . London's population, by contrast, took  years to grow from one to seven million. The bulk of global urban growth is occurring, and is expected to occur, in the low-income countries of South Asia. In , India alone will probably have three of the world's  (and Asia's ) megacities: Mumbai, Delhi and Kolkata, with projected populations of ,  and  million respectively, with Hyderabad, Bangalore and Chennai not far behind. Additionally, India will probably have  cities with populations of over one million (UN Population Division, ).
Finally, while policies directed at congestion, transport emissions and other urban problems have been motivated by the rapidly deteriorating situation in Delhi and other metropolitan centres, these cities are by no means unique. Over the last three decades, motor-vehicle numbers have increased more rapidly in Ahmedabad, Bangalore and Chennai than in Delhi (ASRTU/CIRT, ; SIAM, ). Air pollution levels are as high in many secondary Indian cities as in Delhi (Brandon and Homman, ; CPCB, ). While Delhi, the Indian capital, does not suffer from a lack of roads, other Indian cities are not in this fortunate position (Mohan et al., ; TERI, ). Given that the bulk of the urban population resides in secondary cities, and that these cities will account for the largest shares of future population growth (UN Population Division, ), overall exposures in secondary cities will probably far exceed those in the megacities. Additionally, infrastructure and services are often more stressed, and the ability to address problems is more constrained, in the secondary cities than in the major metropolitan centres.
Urban transport needs and priorities
I shall next discuss the transport needs and priorities of the urban population in India, and in particular low-income groups and the poor, who form the bulk of that population, in terms of the travel characteristics of these groups. For this purpose I shall draw on, among other sources, the household travel survey conducted in Delhi (RITES/ORG, ). Although a decade old, it is perhaps the most extensive household travel survey conducted in an Indian city in the recent past. Motor-vehicle activity has undoubtedly increased over the last decade, but it is likely that mode shares have not changed significantly. Indeed, more recent mode share data for Delhi, from , reported by Tiwari (), match that in the RITES/ORG survey substantially. Besides, the urban transport needs and priorities of the low-income groups and the poor, which are our primary concern here, remain (and are likely to remain) substantially the same as they were a decade ago. The RITES/ORG () survey may therefore be used as a reasonable guide to the urban transport situation, at least for residential households in the major metropolitan centres in India.
The rapid increase in ownership and use of personal motor vehicles in Indian cities is reflected in the higher ownership of MW vehicles compared with bicycles among residential households in the RITES/ORG () survey. Further, as Tiwari () observes, MW and for-hire MW vehicles and tempos, as well as bicycles and cycle rickshaws, tend to account for significant shares of passenger trips in Indian cities with populations of up to five million. This is because public transit cannot be sustained at a sufficiently large scale, on account of extremely restricted municipal resources and personal incomes, and therefore plays a limited role, at best, in these cities. Notwithstanding the above trends, non-motorised mode ownership and use continue to be significant, and public transit plays a major role, in the large metropolitan centres. Figure  shows the mode shares of trips conducted by residential households in the RITES/ORG () survey in Delhi. Note the very high shares of walking and bicycle trips, as well as of public transit, in what is the most motorised city in India. In fact, public transit accounts for  per cent of all trips by mechanised modes, that is, by all modes excluding walking. Public transit shares are very high in other cities as well: in Mumbai, almost  per cent of trips are by transit - per cent by bus and  per cent by suburban rail (Sathaye et al., ). Further, while bicycle mode shares have declined significantly since the late s, and mode shares of MW vehicles have increased equally significantly (from  per cent of trips by mechanical modes in  to  per cent in ), bus mode shares increased from  per cent to  per cent over this period. As for the mechanised non-motorised modes, Tiwari () points out that, although their shares are no longer as high as they used to be in Delhi, there are probably as many as . million bicycles and , cycle rickshaws in the city. Figure  compares the mode shares of the lowest-income group with those of the highest-income group in the RITES/ORG () survey. Not surprisingly, the share of personal motorised modes is low for the lowest-income group; also unsurprisingly, the lowest-income group relies very heavily on walking. This is only to be expected, given that trip distances are typically low for low-income groups: as Tiwari () points out, the poor live as close as possible to their workplaces, often in sub-standard housing in unplanned settlements, because of long working hours and the need to minimise transport expenditure. It is also worth noting the heavy reliance on bicycles and buses by the lowest-income group for their trip making. As for the highest-income group, despite their unsurprisingly higher use of personal motorised modes, bus shares are in fact higher than for the lowest-income group. This is in part due to their high use of 'chartered' buses, which offer point-to-point service and guaranteed seating, for a monthly fee. At any rate, this shows that bus service is crucial not only for the lower-and middle-income groups but for higher-income groups as well, despite their high personal motor-vehicle ownership and use.
An examination of the distribution of trips by purpose, and the mode shares for the most important trips, for different income groups, is also instructive. Education, work and business trips accounted for ,  and  per cent respectively of all trips (excluding return trips) in the RITES/ORG () survey. Importantly from an urban transport perspective, there are very few 'discretionary' (i.e., non-essential) trips (unlike in North America, for example). Reliance on buses, MW vehicles and bicycles is the highest for work trips. More than half of work trips are conducted by bus (Fig. ) . Further, more work trips are conducted on bicycles than by car. Buses, MW vehicles and bicycles, besides walking, are therefore crucially important for work trips, with bicycles and walking being more so for lower-income groups, and buses being relied upon heavily across all income groups. Personal motorised modes account for insignificant shares of education trips. More than half of education trips are conducted by walking -far more than for any other trip purpose, including shopping -and more than a third by bus (Fig. ) . Even the highest-income groups rely heavily on these modes for this trip purpose. The fact that education trips are primarily conducted on foot is not surprising, given that this trip purpose has the lowest average trip distance of all trip purposes (. kilometres in the RITES/ORG [] survey). The heavy reliance on buses for work and education trips is not surprising either, since these trips are often single-purpose, and are performed singly. Interestingly, chartered buses are used for education trips far more than for any other trip purpose, including work trips, and predominantly by the higher-income groups. Next, I consider expenditure on transport for different income groups. Transport expenditure accounted for about  per cent of total household income on average in the RITES/ORG () survey. However, as shown in Table  , transport expenditure as a share of total household income was the lowest for the second-highest-income group, and the highest for the lowest-income group. Further, among those who used MW vehicles regularly,  per cent spent below INR  monthly, and  per cent spent INR -, monthly, on transport. By contrast,  per cent of regular car users spent less than INR  monthly, and only  per cent spent INR -, monthly. It is likely that such a large percentage of higher-income car users spent so little on transport compared with MW vehicle users because of company travel expense reimbursements (RITES/ORG, ). In any case, low-income households appear to spend larger shares of their income on transport, thus affecting their expenditure on health, shelter and food (Tiwari, ).
The RITES/ORG () travel survey is perhaps the most extensive conducted for any Indian city. However, it focused only on the legally accommodated residential population; the homeless, institutional and floating populations were not covered. Every single household surveyed had at least one employed person. Even so, nearly  per cent did not own even a bicycle (RITES/ORG, ). But legally accommodated residential households form a minority proportion of the total urban population. According to Tiwari (), about three-quarters of the population of even an affluent city like Delhi, that is to say, about  million people, live in marginal or substandard settlements. About  per cent reportedly live in slums. The growth rate of squatter settlements is four times higher than that of legally accommodated residential households. The majority in squatter settlements work in temporary, unskilled jobs and as daily labour. Even the subsidised bus fares are simply unaffordable for a significant proportion of Delhi residents -for a household on the outskirts of Delhi, with a monthly income of INR ,, daily round-trip bus fares for just one worker would consume  per cent or more of this income. For households with lower incomes, the already low bus fares would be prohibitively expensive (Tiwari, ). While those who can afford them at least have recourse to MW vehicles, access and mobility are severely compromised for the majority who are too poor to afford even the least expensive motorised modes. It is therefore likely that the non-motorised modes, and to a lesser extent public transit, account for a significantly higher share of trips in cities like Delhi than studies such as the RITES/ORG () survey would indicate.
The urban transport challenge and policy implications
In summary, the urban transport situation in India is that while motor-vehicle activity is already causing far higher levels of impacts than in the OECD countries, despite far lower motor-vehicle activity levels, and while infrastructure and resources are far from adequate to accommodate even present impact levels, motor-vehicle activity is likely to grow over the coming decades in Indian cities. But even as urban incomes rise, Indian cities are characterised by mass poverty. Although low-income groups and the poor, who form the bulk of urban populations, benefit the least from motor-vehicle activity, and contribute the least to urban transport impacts, they and the most environmentally and socially friendly modes they depend on are the most affected by them.
Since motor-vehicle activity in India is characterised by high levels of impacts per unit activity, technological and infrastructural measures are important, but while such measures can be neutralised even without resource constraints, the Indian context, which can barely cope with even present urban transport impacts, is characterised by multiple urgent demands on increasingly constrained resources. Hence, the urban transport challenge is one of catering for rapidly growing mass mobility needs, while minimising adverse socio-economic, environmental, and health and welfare impacts, which affect the poor the most, within a context of severe resource constraints.
Given the resource constraints and the affordability problems faced by the vast majority of city dwellers, it would be desirable for countries such as India to develop transport systems that are sensitive to their needs and priorities, as well as their capabilities and constraints, to fulfil mass mobility needs at low cost. It would also be desirable, given the realities of the context, for urban transport planning to accommodate a wide range of motor vehicles as well as large numbers of pedestrians and cyclists, while maintaining low levels of congestion, yet without a great deal of road building.
In view of the foregoing, there is a critical need to minimise personal motorvehicle activity, through policies that discourage the use of such vehicles, while at the same time providing infrastructure to support safe non-motorised mode use, and an extensive, reliable and convenient public transit service; after all, motor-vehicle ownership and use is often a forced choice and expenditure in the circumstances. While walking and cycling are by their nature environmentally benign, public transit consumes less energy and emits lower health-critical emissions per passenger-kilometre than personal motorised modes, on account of the fact that it carries people far more efficiently. In Delhi, for example, whereas MW vehicles accounted for  per cent of vehicle-kilometres but only  per cent of passenger-kilometres, buses accounted for only around  per cent of vehicle-kilometres but as much as  per cent of passengerkilometres in motorised passenger vehicles in the mid-s (Badami, ). For the same reason, public transit, and indeed even bicycles, use far less road space to transport people than do personal motorised modes. This fact is extremely important given resource and space constraints. Although walking and cycling are the modes most affected by road accidents, they themselves contribute almost nothing to road accident fatalities, and public transit is significantly better in this regard than personal motorised modes (Pendakur et al., ). In Delhi, bus passengers have the lowest fatalities per passenger trip (Tiwari, ), although there are some fatalities involved in accessing buses, and buses contribute significantly to MW vehicle user, pedestrian and cyclist fatalities (Mohan and Tiwari, ).
Providing infrastructure for non-motorised modes and affordable public transit service is vitally important not only because of their environmental and safety benefits, and cost-effectiveness, but also because all income groups rely on them to a lesser or greater degree. But the need to provide for these modes is the greatest from the perspective of the majority who have no choice but to walk and cycle, and use public transit if they can afford it, however inconvenient and time-consuming it may be. They depend on these modes for their economic survival. With rapidly growing urban populations, many of whom will probably be poor, these modes are likely to remain the mainstay of the majority for years to come.
Non-motorised modes and public transit: potential, challenges and strategies
Non-motorised mode shares are already high, despite adverse conditions. But the potential for enhanced use of these rather than personal motorised modes is considerable, if facilities can be created for them. A significant proportion of trips, and even work and MW trips, are conducted over short distances (Fig. ) . Further, bicycles already appear to be faster than buses over considerable distances (Fig. ) . They would be even more competitive if dedicated facilities were provided and traffic was managed to give priority to bicycles.
While maintaining and expanding transit provision would be desirable from the perspective of catering for mass mobility needs and curbing personal motor-vehicle activity and its impacts, doing so will not be easy. Delhi has the country's largest bus fleet, but even this fleet has not been able to keep up with growing demand. Many public transit operators are experiencing serious revenue shortfalls, despite growing passenger numbers, due to rising operating costs. The Delhi Transport Corporation, the state-owned public bus transit operator in Delhi, has been continually dependent on government loans, which can never realistically be repaid. Its buses are frequently Figure 6 Distribution of trips by distance in Delhi non-operational (ASRTU/CIRT, ). The supply situation, as a result of which transit is ever more unreliable, crowded, inconvenient and time-consuming, is aggravated by an ageing bus fleet, shortened vehicle life due to heavy use, poor fleet maintenance, and poor roads (Sathaye et al., ; Tiwari, ). As a response to the serious shortcomings of its public bus transport system, Delhi has turned increasingly to the private sector to help expand service. While privatisation has increased capacity, bus service remains poor. A large number of private operators run the majority of Delhi's buses, under conditions of high capital costs, regulated fares, and slender margins. The operators therefore have little ability or incentive to maintain their vehicles for passenger convenience, let alone invest in fleet expansion or improvements.
The metropolitan centres in India have relied predominantly on buses for their public transport needs, with the exception of Mumbai, where suburban rail plays a major role. However, urban rail projects are either being built or are being considered for various Indian cities, including Delhi, where a rail-based Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS), an idea studied since at least the s, is at last taking shape. The system, the bulk of which will run above ground, is expected to be . kilometres long when completed. The first phase of  kilometres, of which an . kilometre section became operational in December , is expected to be completed in , and to cost US$. billion,  per cent of which will be financed by a Japanese government loan (DMRC, ).
There is an ongoing debate on the ability of rail-based mass transit systems to reduce personal motor-vehicle activity and congestion, and their financial viability in low-income countries. Kenworthy and Laube (), for example, argue strongly in favour of urban rail. They and other proponents of these systems point out that a high level of service including time competitiveness is required to persuade personal motor-vehicle users to switch to transit, particularly as incomes grow. Buses cannot provide the frequency or capacity to cope with heavy passenger loads, particularly in dense cities with limited road capacity and severe traffic congestion, such as those in low-income Asian countries. Buses are severely slowed down in these conditions, leading to longer journey times; note in this regard the unfavourable door-to-door journey times for buses compared with cars and MW vehicles, and even bicycles (Fig.  ) . On the other hand, segregated rail systems, because they are not constrained by traffic, have the potential to transport large numbers of people quickly. Further, urban rail provides more reliable, comfortable, safe and high profile service than do buses. As a result, rail has the potential to attract people from personal motor vehicles in addition to captive users. Cities with a higher level of rail service within their transit systems generally have lower automobile dependence and higher transit utilisation, due to the superior speed of rail systems and the other advantages alluded to above. Kenworthy and Laube () point to Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo, which, despite their wealth, have low automobile dependence and high transit usage, largely due to investment in rail transit. Mohan et al. () have assessed urban rail with specific reference to low-and middle-income countries, based on a survey of rail systems in several cities in these countries. Most systems, with some notable exceptions, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, have experienced construction delays, high capital costs (up to US$ million per kilometre), lower than expected patronage levels and revenue-to-operating cost ratios, and massive continuing subsidies. For all this, there appears to be only short-lived impact or no impact on congestion in the majority of cities, because private traffic rapidly grows to utilise released road capacity. While rail systems may cause bus users to transfer to them, they attract no more than a small share of private motor-vehicle users, which is key in reducing congestion and emissions. Further, while passengers are mostly captured from buses, reduction in bus traffic is not proportional, and in any case bus traffic represents only a small portion of vehicle traffic (Mohan et al., ; Sathaye et al., ).
The financial viability of urban rail systems depends critically on a large population with high per capita incomes, high utilisation levels and fares, and low staffing and wage levels. Experience from several low-income countries, discussed by Mohan et al. () , suggests that high fares cannot be charged without losing patronage. To attract patronage, the integrated bus and rail fare should ideally not be much higher than the existing bus fare; if it is, the poor will continue to use buses. Any attempt to remove bus competition is likely to cause major disruptions in people's lives, and the displacement of many small operators (Mohan et al., ) . This means that fares in low-income cities are likely to require subsidising, which would adversely affect financial viability, and would drain resources from other important social sectors (and rural areas) to benefit the urban middle class. Whereas Singapore's average per capita income, for example, is around US$,, that in Delhi (one of India's wealthiest regions) is only around US$ (Kenworthy and Laube, ; NCTD, ). In Delhi, there is a sufficiently large section of the population with the per capita incomes necessary to sustain rail transit. This is also of course the section that uses motor vehicles, and is therefore the target of rail transit, but the marginal costs of using MW vehicles, which form the bulk of the motor vehicle fleet, are low. The success of the rail systems in Hong Kong and Singapore is largely due to their governments' ability to control land use to ensure large concentrations of employment and paying passengers in close proximity to rail transit stops, and to apply strong measures to curb personal motor-vehicle ownership and use, by way of high taxes, parking costs and traffic restraint. Indian cities of course have the population densities to make a viable rail transit system possible, but it is unclear how successful they could be in applying such measures. In this regard, note the extreme difficulty in controlling parking of MW vehicles, particularly mopeds.
Finally, Indian cities lack the resources to build rail systems that are both extensive and fine-grained, which would be required to make a significant dent in motorvehicle use in urban forms such as Delhi's that are growing in all directions.
Urban rail has the potential to meet mass mobility needs, given extensive coverage, high per capita incomes, strong controls on personal motor-vehicle use and effective integration with land use, but in view of the foregoing discussion, it is not clear how effective urban rail systems will be in Indian cities in terms of curbing motor-vehicle use and congestion. Even if these systems are effective, it will be several years before they become fully operational. Personal motor-vehicle activity, particularly on MW vehicles, is likely to grow in the foreseeable future, for the reasons discussed. There is a critical need for affordable, low-cost mass transit solutions that are appropriate to the needs, capabilities and constraints in the Indian context. Busbased systems have the potential to address this need. In any case, even if urban rail is implemented, efficient feeder buses will be needed in order for it to be truly effective, especially given the lack of resources for an extensive, fine-grained system. Lastly, it is unlikely that urban rail would be economically viable in the medium-sized cities of India, in which per capita incomes are low and population growth and mobility needs are increasing rapidly.
But as I have discussed, expanding bus services will be difficult. This would indicate the need to achieve improved service and higher operating efficiencies with existing bus fleets, but this is by no means an easy task. However, the predominance of work and education trips, the significant proportion of these trips that are performed by bus even in households owning MW vehicles and cars, and the fact that these trips are typically conducted by people travelling alone, demonstrates the potential for medium-to long-distance personal motor-vehicle trips for these purposes to be transferred to public transit. Further, the high willingness of many car and MW vehicle owners to pay for the reliability, reduced journey time and enhanced comfort that express, limited-stop chartered buses offer demonstrate the importance of such services in facilitating this mode transfer and reducing personal vehicle trips and related energy, emissions and other impacts, and finally, the potential for making bus transit more financially viable.
But there is only so much one can do with existing bus infrastructure. I have already discussed the inability of buses to cope with heavy passenger loads in mixed traffic in dense settings with limited road capacity, conditions characteristic of many Indian cities. Further, since bicycles and other non-motorised modes use the kerb lane, buses are forced to stop in the middle lane, making passenger boarding and alighting both difficult and hazardous (Tiwari, ). The public transit challenge in Indian cities may succinctly be described as one of improving service to maintain and enhance bus use, at low cost, in dense settings with limited road capacity. One possible answer to this difficult challenge is to implement, wherever appropriate and possible, rapid bus transit systems operating on dedicated busways, since such systems offer high line-haul capacities, at significantly lower costs than urban rail (Rabinovitch and Leitman, ; Mohan et al., ) .
But what will the infrastructure needs be for such systems, and how can they be accommodated in dense settings? The fact that the transport system does not cater for mixed traffic causes all modes to operate sub-optimally, including increasing hazards for non-motorised mode users, and hampering bus operation and service provision. Much higher levels of service can potentially be achieved with the existing infrastructure, provided it is used efficiently, especially in cities such as Delhi, which do not lack road space. It is important that infrastructure be designed to accommodate multiple modes, based on the recognition that, just as dedicated facilities for nonmotorised modes are necessary to make these modes attractive, bus systems need to be separated from non-motorised modes in order to operate efficiently. In cities such as Delhi, where most arterials have service roads, existing road space is sufficient to accommodate, with suitable redesign, an exclusive lane for cycles and rickshaws, a separate pedestrian path, and a dedicated bus lane. Providing segregated facilities for bicycles would cost very little but would substantially increase available road space. This arrangement would allow cyclists to travel safely, thus making cycling more attractive; further, it would help use existing road infrastructure more efficiently, by freeing up space used by bicycles, and making it available for dedicated busways, making bus service more attractive and effective (Mohan et al., ; Tiwari, ). Of course, rapid bus transit systems need to be designed carefully in order to achieve high speeds and capacities; as Vasconcellos () points out, poorly designed systems can cause busway speeds to be even lower than those of kerb-side lanes.
Conclusions
Urban transport policy in India has been biased in favour of modes that serve only a small section of society, at great cost, and at the expense of low-income groups and the urban poor. While scarce resources are deployed for expensive infrastructure to accommodate personal motor vehicles, and hardly any restrictions are placed on the use of such vehicles, non-motorised modes, which are low-cost yet benefit the majority, are ignored, and indeed are actively discriminated against. In a nation of pedestrians, pedestrians have become third-class citizens. Meanwhile, market access and investment opportunities are being provided for international automobile manufacturers. While foreign investment in vehicle manufacture and road infrastructure has the potential to reduce impacts per unit activity, Indian cities might become locked into a system that makes increased motor-vehicle ownership and use inevitable. Policies focusing on infrastructure for motor vehicles at the expense of that for non-motorised modes and public transit are likely to further disadvantage low-income groups and the urban poor, while not benefiting personal motor-vehicle users in the long run. Apart from adversely affecting local well-being and environments, such policies would also have serious implications for global issues such as climate change and energy security. While growth in energy consumption in transport is likely to be very slow in the OECD countries, that in countries such as India and China could double or triple over the next three decades (Grübler, ).
Given these possibilities, and the realities of the Indian context, Indian cities need to build urban access and mobility systems that are low-cost, resource-conserving, environmentally benign and socially just. Such systems must focus on providing access to the many rather than mobility to only a few. Thus, while personal motor vehicles must be provided for, we must accord primacy to reducing the need to own and use them. What is called for is urban transport planning that is sensitive to the needs, capabilities and constraints of the Indian context, and that recognises a diversity of modes, and users with differing abilities to afford transport and to cope with transport impacts. In short, this paper makes a plea to cut the urban transport coat according to the cloth.
Personal motor-vehicle ownership and use of course depend on incomes, and user preferences. However, countries such as India can take encouragement from Singapore and Hong Kong, which have shown that growing incomes do not inevitably lead to heavy dependence on private motorised modes. As Kenworthy and Laube () point out, policies that make personal motor-vehicle users pay their way, but also stress infrastructure provision for non-motorised modes and public transit, can dampen automobile ownership and use, even as urban incomes increase.
Finally, it is worth noting that, while planning for non-motorised modes and public transit is a vitally important priority in itself, given the socio-economic realities and travel needs of the vast majority in Indian cities, such planning will benefit not only the low-income groups and the urban poor but in fact all transport system users.
